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INTRODUCTION:		GLOBAL	ORDER	OF	THE	COURT	
Martin	S.	Flaherty*	For	 worse,	 not	 better,	 we	 live	 in	 a	 time	 when	 evidence,	expertise,	even	reality	itself,	matter	less	than	uniformed	assertion.	Just	 repeat	 a	 baseless	 claim	often	 enough	 and	 sooner	 or	 later	 it	must	 be	 true.	 It	 sadly	 goes	 without	 saying	 that	 this	 technique	provides	 a	 ticket	 to	 the	White	 House	 and	 the	 Executive	 Branch	more	 generally.	 It	 should,	 however,	more	 often	 be	 said	 that	 the	Supreme	Court	is	not	above	the	practice.	This	indulgence	would	be	bad	enough	in	itself,	especially	for	an	institution	whose	legitimacy	is	based	upon	reasoned	fidelity	to	the	law	rather	than	a	majority	of	ballots.	Yet	merely	repeating	an	assertion	without	more	is	doubly	problematic	when	the	Court	does	so	to	sidestep	its	duty	to	check	misconduct	of	an	Executive	Branch	that	pushes	past	the	borders	of	legality—including	and	especially	in	foreign	affairs.	The	Supreme	Court	did	just	this	at	just	about	the	same	time	the	papers	for	this	symposium	were	being	delivered.	The	case	was	
Hernández	v.	Mesa.1	It	arose	when	Jesus	Mesa,	a	US	Border	Patrol	agent,	shot	dead	Sergio	Adrián	Hernández	Güereca,	a	fifteen-year-old	 Mexican	 national.	 At	 the	 time,	 Mesa	 was	 standing	 in	 US	territory	 while	 Hernández	 had	 just	 run	 across	 the	 border	 to	Mexico.	 Members	 of	 the	 slain	 teenager’s	 family	 brought	 a	 civil	action	 seeking	 damages	 in	 US	 District	 Court	 under	Bivens	 v.	 Six	
Unknown	 Federal	 Narcotics	 Agents, 2 	alleging	 that	 Mesa	 violated	Hernández’s	 Fourth	 and	 Fifth	 Amendment	 rights.	 In	Bivens,	 the	Court	 had	 held	 that	 a	 person	 claiming	 to	 be	 the	 victim	 of	 an	unlawful	arrest	and	search	could	bring	a	Fourth	Amendment	claim	
 *	 Leitner	 Family	 Professor	 of	 International	 Human	 Rights,	 Founding	 Co-Director,	Leitner	Center	for	International	Law	and	Justice,	Fordham	Law	School;	Visiting	Professor,	Woodrow	Wilson	School	of	Public	and	International	Law,	Princeton	University.	1.	 Hernandez	v.	Mesa,	589	U.S.	__	(2020).	2.	 Bivens	v.	Six	Unknown	Named	Agents	of	Fed.	Bureau	of	Narcotics,	403	U.	S.	388	(1971).	
1230	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	for	damages	against	the	responsible	agents	even	though	no	federal	statute	authorized	such	a	claim.	Later	decisions	extended	Bivens	to	claims	 under	 the	 Fifth3 	and	 Eighth4 	Amendments.	 The	 issue	 in	
Mesa	came	down	to	applying	Bivens	not	to	additional	constitutional	amendments,	 but	 rather	 to	 the	 “new”5	context	 of	 alleged	 cross-border	 extrajudicial	 murder.	 Or	 as	 Justice	 Ginsburg	 put	 it	 in	dissent,	“[i]s	a	Bivens	remedy	available	to	non-citizens	(here,	the	victim’s	 parents)	 when	 the	 U.	 S.	 officer	 acted	 stateside,	 but	 the	impact	of	his	alleged	wrongdoing	was	suffered	abroad?”6	The	 Court	 answered	 no.	 Justice	 Alito’s	 majority	 opinion	offered	 several	 reasons.	 Consider	 them	 in	 ascending	 order	 of	judicial	 self-abnegation.	 First,	 Congress	 in	 related	 areas	 has	declined	 to	 provide	 for	 a	 cause	 of	 action	 for	 such	 ostensibly	extraterritorial	 conduct.	 Such	 inaction,	moreover,	must	 be	 given	additional	weight	given	the	issue	involved	“national	security,”	and	judicial	 intervention	might	undermine	protection	of	 the	nation’s	borders,	“[w]hen	foreign	relations	are	implicated.”7	Next,	the	case	involved	“national	security.”8	Judicial	intervention	in	the	matter	of	an	 alleged	 rogue	 federal	 agent	 in	 the	 United	 States	 shooting	 an	unarmed	teenager	in	Mexico	could	well	undermine	the	protection	of	 the	 nation’s	 borders.	 Third	 and	more	 broadly,	Mesa	 involved	foreign	affairs.	 In	 the	majority’s	words,	 “[t]he	political	branches,	not	the	Judiciary,	have	the	responsibility	and	institutional	capacity	to	 weigh	 foreign-policy	 concerns.” 9 	Indeed,	 the	 Court	 had	previously	 “said	 that	matters	 relating	 ‘to	 the	 conduct	 of	 foreign	relations	.	.	.	are	so	exclusively	entrusted	to	the	political	branches	of	 government	 as	 to	 be	 largely	 immune	 from	 judicial	 inquiry	 or	interference.’”10	Determined	to	repeat	the	theme	until	it	became	true,	Justice	Alito	 concluded	 that	 in	 sum,	 these	preceding	 factors,	 “can	 all	 be	condensed	to	one	concern––respect	for	the	separation	of	powers.”	And	 for	him,	 that	meant	nothing	 less	 than	 that	 “‘[f]oreign	policy	and	national	security	decisions	are	‘delicate,	complex,	and	involve	
 3.	 Davis	v.	Passman,	442	U.	S.	228,	248-49	(1979).	4.	 Carlson	v.	Green,	446	U.	S.	14,	19-25	(1980).	5.	 Hernandez	v.	Mesa,	No.	17-1678,	slip	op.	at	1,	8	(Feb.	25,	2020).	6.	 Id.	at	1-2	(Ginsburg,	J.,	dissenting).	7.	 Id.	at	14.	8.	 Id.	at	12.	9.	 Id.	at	9	(citations	omitted).	10.	 	Id.	(citations	omitted).	
2020]	 INTRODUCTION:	GLOBAL	ORDER	OF	THE	COURT	 1231	large	 elements	 of	 prophecy’	 for	which	 ‘the	 Judiciary	has	neither	aptitude,	facilities[,]	nor	responsibility.’”11	Justice	Ginsburg,	writing	for	three	dissenters,	challenged	the	majority’s	inaction	based	on	foreign	affairs.	First,	a	tort	action	for	a	 cross-border	 shooting	 hardly	 represented	 an	 intrusion	 on	 the	province	of	the	political	branches	to	make	foreign	policy.	Second,	in	 any	 event	 “the	 Court,	 in	 this	 case,	 cannot	 escape	 a	 ‘potential	effect	 on	 foreign	 relations,’	 by	 declining	 to	 recognize	 a	 Bivens	action.” 12 	Among	 other	 things,	 “recognizing	 a	 Bivens	 suit	 here	honors	our	Nation’s	international	commitments.”13	Displaying	her	demonstrated	familiarity	with	international	law,	Justice	Ginsberg	pointed	to	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	(“ICCPR”)	 to	 which	 the	 United	 States	 acceded	 in	 1992. 14 	In	particular,	she	cited	Article	9(5)	of	which	provides	that	“[a]nyone	who	has	been	the	victim	of	unlawful	arrest	or	detention	shall	have	an	enforceable	right	to	compensation.”15	All	told,	Justice	Ginsburg	makes	a	compelling	case.	Yet	that	case	could	be	more	compelling	still.	Such	a	case	would	and	should	challenge	directly	the	oft-repeated	but	rarely	justified	mantra	 that	 “matters	 relating	 ‘to	 the	 conduct	 of	 foreign	relations	.	.	.	are	so	exclusively	entrusted	to	the	political	branches	of	 government	 as	 to	 be	 largely	 immune	 from	 judicial	 inquiry	 or	interference.’”16	The	present	symposium	arises	out	of	the	Author’s	recent	book	that	 refutes	 this	 refrain.	Restoring	 the	 Global	 Judiciary:	Why	 the	
Supreme	Court	Should	Rule	in	Foreign	Affairs	aims	to	reinvigorate	the	increasingly	marginalized	case	for	robust	judicial	role	in	cases	such	 as	 Mesa. 17 	Its	 argument	 is	 straightforward.	 The	 Supreme	Court	and	the	federal	judiciary	have	not	only	the	power,	but	also	the	 duty	 to	 apply	 the	 law,	 including	 international	 law,	 in	 cases	properly	before	them	without	deference	to	the	political	branches.	
 11.	 Id.	at	19	(citations	omitted).	12.	 Id.	at	10	(Ginsburg,	J.,	dissenting).	13.	 Id.	14.	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	Dec.	19,	1966,	S.	Treaty	Doc.	No.	95–20,	999	U.	N.	T.	S.	176;	see	also	1676	U.	N.	T.	S.	544	(entered	into	force	Sept.	8,	1992).	15.	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	art.	9(5).	16.	 See	Hernandez,	supra	note	5,	at	9.	17.	 See	 generally	 MARTIN	 S.	 FLAHERTY,	 RESTORING	 THE	 GLOBAL	 JUDICIARY:	 WHY	 THE	SUPREME	COURT	SHOULD	RULE	IN	FOREIGN	AFFAIRS	(2019).	
1232	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	This	argument	proceeds	in	four	parts.	The	first	focuses	on	the	expectations	 of	 the	 Founding.	 This	 part	 holds	 that	 the	Constitution’s	 designers	 and	 supporters	 were	 committed	 to	 a	balance	among	the	three	branches	of	government	as	much—if	not	more—in	 foreign	 as	 in	 domestic	 affairs.	 They	 were	 further	markedly	 internationalist,	 with	 the	 corollary	 that	 the	 judiciary	should	 play	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 matters	 implicating	 both	international	 law	 and	 foreign	 relations,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	individual	rights.	Much	of	the	impetus	for	the	Federal	Convention	came	 from	 the	nation’s	 impotence	 in	upholding	 its	 international	obligations.	The	Constitution’s	Federalist	supporters	also	favored	adherence	 to	 the	 law	 of	 nations	 as	 a	 safeguard	 for	 a	 new,	weak	republic	 in	 the	 face	of	European	 superpowers.	The	Constitution,	therefore,	 strengthened	 the	 national	 government’s	 ability	 to	conduct	foreign	relations	in	several	regards.	One	key	component	was	 a	 national	 judiciary	 that	 would	 have	 jurisdiction	 over	 self-executing	 treaties,	 original	 jurisdiction	 over	 cases	 involving	diplomats,	 and	 the	 authority	 to	 implement	 customary	international	law.	Reflecting	this	commitment,	the	early	Supreme	Court	 numbered	 a	 striking	 selection	 of	 prominent	 diplomats	among	 its	 members,	 including	 John	 Jay	 and	 John	 Marshall.	 The	Court	 accordingly	 tended	 to	 accord	 the	 other	 branches	 zero	deference	 when	 it	 came	 to	 cases	 involving	 international	 law	 or	foreign	relations.18	The	 book’s	 second	 part	 explains	 how	 this	 Founding	conception	eroded	as	the	United	States	developed	from	a	fledgling	republic	 to	 a	 global	 superpower.	 Over	 time	 the	 Founding	framework	went	 from	a	balanced	 system	with	 an	 active	 judicial	role	to	our	current	constitutional	construct	in	which	the	Executive	claims	to	near-plenary	foreign	affairs	power	appear	plausible.	The	change	occurred	largely	as	a	result	of	America’s	emergence	on	the	world	stage.	As	the	nation	went	from	world	power	to	superpower	to	hegemon,	the	almost	inevitable	result	was	an	accretion	of	power	to	the	Executive.	Evolving	constitutional	custom	has	long	been	an	important	 source	of	 doctrine	 in	 the	 foreign	 affairs	 realm.	When,	however,	 custom	 moves	 from	 illegitimate	 challenge	 to	 the	established	order	is	another	matter.	This	part	argues	that	much	of	the	shift	in	power	to	the	President	is	of	questionable	legitimacy	in	
 18.	 Id.	Part	I.	
2020]	 INTRODUCTION:	GLOBAL	ORDER	OF	THE	COURT	 1233	light	 of	 the	 Founding	 commitment	 to	 separation	 of	 powers	balance.19	The	 book’s	 third	 part	 examines	 how	 modern	 international	relations	theory	makes	the	Founding’s	commitment	to	balance	all	the	 more	 critical.	 A	 leading	 International	 Relations	 school	developed	 by	 Joseph	 Nye,	 Robert	 Keohane,	 and	 Anne-Marie	Slaughter	 emphasizes	 the	 erosion	 of	 traditional	 sovereignty	through	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 “disaggregated	 state.” 20 	On	 this	understanding,	nation-states	no	 longer	deal	with	one	another	as	single	units.	Rather,	sub-units	of	states	interact	directly	with	their	counterparts	 to	 form	 “global	 networks”	 that	 pool	 information,	undertake	joint	projects,	and	establish	formal	ties.21	Innovative	as	this	scholarship	is,	it	does	not	ask	the	key	question	of	which	set	of	actors	comparatively	benefits.	Here	Restoring	the	Global	Judiciary	argues	that	the	Executive	far	and	away	outpaces	its	rivals.	A	distant	second	is	the	judiciary.	Hardly	in	the	race	at	all	are	the	legislators.	The	 implications	 are	 troubling	 for	 any	 state	 with	 an	 ongoing	commitment	to	separation	of	powers	and	the	balance	among	the	branches	of	government	 that	 the	doctrine	entails.	 It	 follows	 that	when	 matters	 touch	 foreign	 relations,	 the	 courts	 should	 check,	rather	than	defer.22	The	 final	 part	 of	 the	 book	 sets	 out	 how	 doctrine	 should	develop	 in	 three	sets	of	hotly	contested	areas.	The	 first	 involves	access	 to	 the	 courts	 to	 begin	 with,	 including	 standing,	 political	
question	 doctrine,	 and	 state	 secrets.	 The	 second	 group	 involves	deference	 to	 the	 other	 branches	 with	 regard	 to	 treaties,	 the	Constitution,	 and	 statutes.	 The	 last	 category	 addresses	 foreign	affairs	law	doctrines	that	implicate	international	human	rights,	and	among	 them	 are	 self-executing	 vs.	 non-self-executing	 treaties,	delegation	 to	 foreign	 tribunals,	 and	 interpreting	 domestic	 law	consistent	with	international	law.23	All	 that	 said,	 the	 book’s	 prescriptions	 do	 come	 with	 an	ostensibly	 insurmountable	 flaw.	 It	may	 seem	 simply	 too	 late	 to	turn	back.	But	 it	 is	not.	 Instead,	 the	current	 situation	 recalls	 the	same	 type	 of	 challenge	 that	 Justice	 Jackson	 addressed	 in	 his	
 19.	 Id.	Part	II.	20.	 Id.	at	137.	21.	 Id.	22.	 Id.	Part	III.	23.	 Id.	Part	IV.	
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Sawyer. 24 	That	 opinion	 also	 identified	 dangerous,	 anti-constitutional	 trends	 resulting	 from	 deeply	 entrenched	 political	dynamics.	Yet	it	also	pointed	a	way	forward.	It	suggested	a	solution	first	in	identifying	the	problem.	Then	it	offered	tools	for	addressing	it.	It	may	appear	that	matters	have	proceeded	too	far.	But	as	Justice	Jackson	also	observed,	“it	is	the	duty	of	the	Court	to	be	the	last,	not	first,	to	give	.	.	.	up”	its	responsibility	to	check	assertions	political	power	 that	 undermine	 the	 Constitution	 and	 with	 it,	 free	government	under	the	law.25		Few	things	are	more	gratifying	 to	 the	Author	 than	spurring	informed	 and	 thoughtful	 discussion,	 dialogue,	 and	 debate.	 First,	not	last,	in	this	regard	is	the	Fordham	International	Law	Journal’s	present	 symposium	 issue	 on	 the	 Judicial	 Power	 and	 US	 Foreign	
Affairs.	 It	 brings	 together	 an	 impressive	 array	 of	 diverse,	established,	and	rising	scholars.	Some	agree	with	 the	arguments	made	 in	Restoring	 the	 Global	 Judiciary;	 others	 do	 not.	 Yet	 all	 of	these	 written	 contributions,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 day’s	 broader	 panel	discussions,	 offer	 rigorous	 and	 thoughtful	 insights	 that	buck	 the	trend	of	merely	repeating	ungrounded	assertions	on	display	in	the	majority	opinion	in	Mesa.	For	this,	special	thanks	are	in	order	to	the	International	Law	
Journal’s	 editors	 and	 staff,	 in	 particular:	 Irene	 Xu,	 Rebecca	Zipursky,	Yon	Jong	Yoon,	and	Samantha	Ragonesi.	My	gratitude	as	well	to	my	exceptional	colleagues,	Pamela	Bookman	and	Andrew	Kent,	who	oversaw	the	event	as	it	took	shape,	and	to	Tom	Lee,	who	stole	what	 time	 he	 could	 away	 from	 the	 Pentagon	 to	 take	 part.	Finally,	my	gratitude	to	all	of	the	participants.	To	these,	I	am	happy	to	 repeat	 a	 thought	 shared	 on	 the	 day.	 The	 first	 rule	 of	 public	relations	may	be	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	bad	publicity	so	long	as	one’s	name	is	spelled	correctly.	The	corollary	for	writing	a	book	is	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	unwanted	criticism	so	long	as	all	agree	that	everyone	should	go	out	and	read	it.	All	did—and	for	that	I	am	particularly	grateful.	
 24 .	 Youngstown	 Sheet	 &	 Tube	 Co.	 v.	 Sawyer,	 343	 U.S.	 579,	 634-60	 (Jackson,	 J.,	concurring)	(1952).	25.	 Id.	at	655.	
